In early 2024, Egyptian banks were sitting on a backlog of unmet dollar demand of roughly $7 billion to $8 billion, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). That is a queue, and a queue is what a price looks like when it is too low. Every request in it came from someone who needed dollars to pay for something abroad and could not get them at the official price.

This part follows that gap. We look at how a gap opens, how four countries met it, what it cost, and how you can spot one. Egypt, Nigeria and Ethiopia each reformed their systems between 2023 and 2024. Libya did not, and it shows what a gap looks like when nothing closes it.

How a gap opens

A central bank announces a price for the dollar. If that price is lower than the market would set on its own, more people want dollars than the central bank can supply. Something has to give.

The first thing to give is access. Banks cannot fill every request, so they ration, delay or refuse. People who cannot get dollars at the official price go to the street, where a dealer sells them at a higher price. That higher price reflects how scarce dollars really are. The distance between the two prices is the parallel-market premium, and it is the cleanest signal that the official rate has stopped describing reality.

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A premium can grow for a long time. Reserves run down. The central bank may cut the official rate in steps, or restrict who can buy, or both. Eventually either the official rate moves toward the street rate, or the gap stays open and people live with it.

In Part 1 we gave four questions to ask of any system. They are the lens for the four cases below.

  • What anchors the rate?

  • What supports it?

  • Can people actually get foreign currency at that rate?

  • Who pays when the system comes under pressure?

The third question is the one a headline rate cannot answer. The premium answers it.

Case 1, Egypt: the day two exchange rates became one

In the IMF's 2025 table, Egypt sat among the soft pegs, with the dollar as its de facto anchor. For roughly a year, a dollar at an Egyptian bank cost about 31 Egyptian pounds, if you could get one. Outside the banks, in the parallel market, the dollar traded at about twice that, which put the pound at around half its official value. The distance between those two numbers was not a curiosity. It was the queue.

On 6 March 2024, Egypt let the two rates become one. The authorities allowed a substantial depreciation of the pound as part of a shift toward a more flexible exchange-rate regime. The pound lost 38% of its dollar value in a day, which is another way of saying that a dollar now cost about 60% more pounds. That closed the gap between the official and parallel rates. The pound has kept drifting since, to about 53 to the dollar this month.

The adjustment was painful. A weaker currency makes imported fuel, food, medicine and machinery more expensive in pounds. Households find that their money buys less, and businesses that depend on imported inputs face higher costs.

Yet keeping an exchange rate unchanged is not the same as keeping an economy stable. If the official price cannot be reached by the people who need it, the apparent stability may make the currency increasingly hard to use. The important development in Egypt was therefore not simply that the pound fell. It was that the authorities brought the official rate closer to the price at which foreign currency could actually be obtained. Later IMF reviews reported that the official and parallel rates stayed close together and that banks were no longer reporting backlogs, even as the currency kept moving.

None of this means depreciation is harmless, or that reform solves a country's problems. It means that a credible exchange-rate system must be judged by how it works in practice, not by the rate on a financial website.

Case 2, Nigeria: a smaller gap and a dearer dollar

Nigeria's story will be familiar to anyone who has needed dollars to import goods, pay for services or run an international operation. On 14 June 2023 the authorities moved to unify the official foreign-exchange windows and allow greater flexibility. The naira fell sharply. The IMF reported that it moved from about ₦461 to the dollar in May 2023 to about ₦900 by the end of that year, which is roughly half its dollar value gone in seven months. Further depreciation followed in early 2024. For households a falling naira means higher prices for imported goods and for local goods that depend on imported machinery, ingredients, fuel or packaging. For a business it can mean revising prices, postponing expansion, or discovering that a contract signed weeks earlier is no longer profitable.

The reform aimed to close the gap between official and parallel prices and to improve how the market works, and on the gap it has worked. The IMF reported the premium narrowing to about -5% by the end of February 2024, which means the street rate had briefly dipped below the official one, and recent quotes put it near 4%. But the price of the dollar has kept rising, to near ₦1,335 this month, which means the naira has lost roughly two-thirds of its dollar value since the unification. A smaller gap is not the same as a cheaper dollar.

Case 3, Ethiopia: moving the rate was only the first step

Ethiopia had an exceptionally wide gap, a parallel-market premium above 100% by November 2023, alongside severe shortages of foreign currency. On 29 July 2024 it moved to a market-determined rate, and the birr lost roughly 30% on the first day. The premium narrowed sharply, reaching near zero by early September.

But convergence did not last in a straight line. The premium widened again, to around 17% by early May 2025. IMF reporting in 2026 continued to identify a spread between official and parallel rates, limited interbank trading and outstanding bank backlogs, and the latest review puts the premium at between 10% and 20%. Ethiopia moved, and then found that moving the official rate was only the first step. A market needs buyers, sellers and trust, and those take longer to build than a decision.

Case 4, Libya: a peg with a gap

Libya shows the divergence without a reform. Its dinar is, formally, a conventional peg to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which should mean predictability. Yet the IMF has described a notable and persistent parallel-market premium.

The central bank has cut the official rate at the start of 2021, in April 2025 (by 13.3%) and in January 2026 (by 14.7%). The IMF's 2026 assessment, as summarised by Dr Najat Altorjman of the University of Sunderland in a Libya Herald opinion piece, found that the gap stayed sizeable despite two official adjustments since April 2025 and significant foreign-exchange sales, which the IMF put down to persistent excess demand for foreign currency. The same piece reports the IMF's estimate that Libya's fiscal deficit reached around 30% of GDP in 2025. Dr Altorjman argues that a gap this size suggests either that formal channels are not meeting demand at the official rate, or that expectations and access constraints are creating a premium of their own.

In October 2026 the official rate was about 6.4 dinars to the dollar and the street rate about 10. That is Salma's gap. It is also a useful reminder that a peg is a rule and not a guarantee. A peg is only as good as the supply of dollars behind it.

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The shape of the problem

Lay the four stories side by side and the same shape appears. An official rate is held or managed. Foreign currency becomes scarce and a parallel market opens. The gap widens, queues form, and restrictions pile up. Then policy changes, and the official rate moves toward the market. What remains is the hard part: liquidity, reserves, inflation and whether the new arrangement is believed.

The differences matter as much as the shape. Egypt's gap closed and Nigeria's has stayed small, while Ethiopia's has come back and Libya's has never really closed. And convergence of two rates is not the same as recovery. Prices rose, savings lost value, and a company that owed dollars paid far more pounds, naira or birr to settle the same debt.

The four cases side by side

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Sources: IMF, European Commission, central bank and press reports, October 2026. Verify every figure on the publication date.

Three of the four countries narrowed their gap by letting the official price move toward the market. The fourth kept its label and kept its gap.

Now run the four questions over the table.

  • What supported the old official rates? Not enough reserves to meet demand at that price, which is why queues formed. Egypt and Nigeria moved toward more flexible arrangements after periods of distortion and shortage. Ethiopia moved toward a market-determined rate but is still listed as other managed in the IMF's April 2026 classification. Libya kept a formal peg to the SDR while adjusting the official value of the dinar.

  • Could people get dollars at those rates? Not in full, and the premium is the measure of how far short it fell. After its reform, Egypt reported cleared backlogs and a closed spread. Nigeria's gap narrowed to a few percent. Ethiopia still had bank backlogs and limited interbank trading in the IMF's 2026 reviews. Libya continued to have a sizeable gap between the official and parallel rates.

  • Who paid? Households and firms, through higher prices in Egypt, Nigeria and Ethiopia, and through the street price in Libya. A flexible currency may depreciate, raising the local-currency cost of imports. A fixed or managed rate may be defended through reserves, restrictions or adjustments to the official parity. The burden can fall on households, firms, taxpayers or those who cannot obtain foreign currency at the official price.

  • What anchors the rate now? In Egypt and Nigeria, the market does, with the central bank leaning in. Ethiopia is moving that way but is not there yet. Libya's rate is still pegged to the SDR.

Aya's system answers the same questions differently. Her anchor is the euro, her support is a French guarantee and pooled reserves, and the price she pays for that support is a central bank that cannot set its own policy. Different answers, same four questions.

So progress is not simply a higher or lower rate. It would mean a system whose prices are informative, whose channels are usable, whose rules are credible and whose adjustment costs are understood and managed.

What the gap costs: three illustrations

The exchange rate becomes personal because the costs of a malfunctioning system are paid in ordinary decisions: what a business can stock, what a family can afford, what a student can plan. Here are three illustrations. They are not reported cases. They use the rounded rates in this article to show how the arithmetic reaches a household.

A student in Lagos. Imagine a $5,000 tuition bill. At about ₦461 to the dollar, the rate in May 2023, it costs about ₦2.3 million. At about ₦1,335, the rate today, it costs about ₦6.7 million. The tuition did not change. The price of the dollar did.

An importer in Cairo. Imagine a $10,000 shipment. At the official rate of about 31 pounds, it costs about 310,000 pounds, if the bank can supply the dollars. A buyer forced to the parallel market, where the dollar cost about twice that, would have paid roughly 620,000. After 6 March 2024 the rate moved to about 50, which puts the same shipment at about 500,000. The move made life dearer for the person who had official access and cheaper for the person who had been buying on the street. A reform does not hurt or help everyone the same way.

A family in Benghazi. Imagine a relative abroad sending $200. If the family can sell those dollars at the street rate of about 10 dinars, they receive about 2,000 dinars. If they are forced to sell at the official rate of about 6.4, they receive about 1,280, which is 36% less. Now imagine a shop owner who needs $1,000 of stock: 6,400 dinars at the official rate, and 10,000 on the street. A gap between two prices is a transfer from one person to another, and which side of it you stand on depends on who you are and what you can reach.

These are the same system seen from different sides: a student paying tuition abroad, an importer, an exporter waiting for payment, a family receiving remittances.

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Three questions for any currency

When we talk about a currency, it is tempting to focus on whether its value is rising or falling. But the number on a screen is only the beginning of the story. Three questions offer a starting point. They are the four we have used all along, folded together.

  1. What rule guides the exchange rate? Is the currency pegged, stabilized, crawling, managed or floating? What does the arrangement commit the authorities to do, and how does it operate in practice?

  2. Can the system meet the demand for foreign currency? Are reserves and institutions strong enough to support the arrangement? Can businesses and households reach foreign currency through the channels the system promises?

  3. When pressure builds, who pays? Does the currency fall, are reserves spent, is access restricted, does a parallel market appear? How are the costs shared between households, businesses and the wider economy?

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Now go back to Aya, Tunde and Salma. Aya's rate is guaranteed, and she pays for that certainty with a central bank that cannot set its own course. Tunde's rate is now set by the market after a painful reset, and he paid in the price of the euro, about threefold, while the gap closed. Salma's rate is promised by a peg, but the euro she needs costs half again as much on the street. The labels would have told you that Aya and Salma were alike and Tunde was different. The questions tell you something more useful: who stands behind each rate, whether each can get the money at that price, and who bears the cost when it moves.

What to take away from Part 2

  • A gap between the official and street price of a dollar is a queue. It tells you the official rate has stopped describing what people can get.

  • Egypt and Nigeria closed their gaps by letting the official price move. Ethiopia narrowed its gap and then saw it return. Libya kept its peg and kept its gap.

  • Closing a gap is not the same as a cheaper dollar. The price of the dollar rose in every case.

  • A reform does not hit everyone equally. Those who relied on the street can gain while those with official access lose.

  • The three questions work on any currency: what rule, can people reach the dollars, and who pays?

Next in the series. Part 3 asks whether a peg makes a country more stable, using our own African Country Index, and what it costs to borrow credibility from someone else.